Relations between Brazil and
globalisation process in international trade negotiations, the growing importance of regional politics and economics, the expansion of social movements and actors intertwined with a renewed importance of democratic values in world politics and a new momentum in South-South relations. However, time and maturity are still needed to assert that Brazil-India bilateral ties and converging interests will emerge as a relevant dimension for each other's international insertion and consequently for the developments of a renewed scenario of South-South relations in the twenty-fi rst century.
Both Brazil and India have assumed a leading role in the process of the revival of South-South diplomacy in world affairs. While this new wave of politicisation may seem to bring back aims and stances voiced by the developing world in the 1970s, it also expresses a new sort of confi guration of inter-state coalition building. The fi rst purpose of this article is to underline the role of Brazil-India relations as the vanguard force of this process. Undoubtedly this is a young and experimental road for both countries which must still meet a myriad of challenges to consolidate, among which are the prospects for both countries to succeed as emerging powers and regional leaders. Besides, and this is the second question addressed in this article, a necessary condition for this experiment to succeed is the deepening of bilateral ties which involves a process of diplomatic acquaintance and of economic interaction. The juvenile nature of the object of study of this article imposes an exploratory dimension to many of the aspects analysed in the following pages.
The next section of this article overviews Brazil's foreign policy with particular attention to developments during the Lula administration. 1 The third section provides a brief description of Brazil-India relations and addresses recent bilateral political and economic initiatives and their primarily results. The fourth section focuses on the role that both countries have been playing in the South-South agenda, with special mention of the IBSA initiative (which also involves South Africa). Finally, the concluding remarks focus mainly upon the challenging aspects of Brazilian-Indian relations in the next future.
I OVERVIEW OF BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY
In recent years Brazil has faced major transformations in its international affairs. A more ambitious foreign policy has been put forward with the aim of expanding the country's presence in global economic negotiations, multilateral institutions and regimes and in regional affairs (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006) . The expanded involvement in global matters has not prevented nationalistic stances from becoming more visible in the Lula government's formulation of foreign policy priorities. Linking the fi ght against poverty and unequal income distribution at home with an active presidential diplomacy has become one of the recent outstanding innovations of Brazilian foreign policy. Hence, the inclusion of the social agenda as a major topic of foreign affairs has become an important international asset.
From an institutional standpoint the Foreign Ministry-known as the Itamaratyremains the main state agency in charge of Brazil's international affairs, whether these are related to political, security or economic, or bilateral, regional or multilateral, agendas. While this obviously imposes a statist profi le to external negotiations and to the motivations behind the defi nition of national interests, it is also true that diplomatic activity has become more complex and is subject to greater societal pressures in a context of intense inter-bureaucratic struggles.
To summarise the transformations undertaken in Brazil's foreign policy, three areas are focused upon: fi rst, international security and politics; second, international trade and third, regional affairs. Although these three aspects do not cover the entire terrain of Brazil's foreign affairs, they do reveal the trends that are most relevant to Brazil's relationship with India.
In the post-Cold War world, international politics tends to follow a fragmented and less predictable pattern. This is particularly so in the case of a country like Brazil, which has fi rmly avoided bandwagon diplomacy since the mid-1970s. Though the terrain for autonomous foreign policy has become more restricted, Brazil aspires to retain some level of independent capability to determine its moves in world and regional affairs.
Since the inauguration of the Lula administration, Brazilian foreign affairs have expanded with the aim to project the country as a global political and economic player. Presidential diplomacy has been linked to an active foreign policy concerned simultaneously with the expansion of ties with the industrialised economies and the emergent South. Relations have been reshaped with the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU); ties have deepened with China and India, together with a renewed South-South multilateralism and unprecedented political presence in South America. Notwithstanding a diversifi ed set of 'external fronts' which has led to an expanded participation in global politics and economic forums, Brazil still faces the constraints imposed by the structural asymmetries of the international system, along with the fact that it is part of a US sphere of infl uence.
In international security, Brazil has been developing a positive agenda regarding adherence to international non-proliferation regimes since the mid-1990s. In 1994, Brazil joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and in 1997 it ratifi ed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Brazil has become an active supporter of the enhancement of multilateral initiatives, particularly the expanded role of the United Nations (UN) in world politics and has increased its own participation and responsibilities.
2 For Brazil, the reinforcement of the juridical and parliamentary structure of the UN system became a permanent demand in the present unipolar order (Amorim 2007 ). Brazil's proactive diplomacy has allowed it to be elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) four times in the postCold War era: in 1989-90, 1993-94, 1998-99 and 2003-04 . Brazil has made clear to world powers and the international community its ambition to be one of the new permanent members of the UNSC if the number of seats increases. It is worth noting that Brazil was absent from the UNSC as a non-permanent member for two decades between 1968 and 1988.
Brazil has developed a set of approaches to face the new global security threats, particularly those involving terrorism. In multilateral arenas, most notably the UN, it has insisted on the need for a conceptual revision of world institutional structures, with special concern towards the humanitarian impact of military action and the importance of equilibrium between solidarity and globalisation. Brazil has avoided full-scale alignment with the US security policies while granting support to the US-led war against terrorism.
3 At the same time, the Lula administration has tried to evolve a balanced position in dealing with Islamist terrorism and Middle East matters. On the one hand, it has aimed to enlarge its visibility with the Arab countries, as has been the case in the initiative of a 2005 Summit of South American-Arab countries, when Brazil refused to invite the US as an observer. On the other hand, Brazil has declined adopting a fl exible approach towards terrorism which could justify the use of violence as legitimate to resist foreign occupation, as many Arab countries claim.
Brazil has become an active player in global trade negotiations ever since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Brazilian foreign trade policy needs to be understood in the context of the macroeconomic changes the country went through in the early 1990s. Since then, Brazil has gradually advanced towards free market economics; moving ahead in liberalising its economy but not giving up its industrial development strategies. In the last 15 years, as Brazil became increasingly exposed to global fi nancial turmoil and speculative monetary attacks, it struggled to conserve room for manoeuvre when handling critical situations. The continuity of Brazil's economic stability involved until very recently recurrent monitoring and endorsement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 4 Brazilian economic policies improved the domestic environment for private transnational capital and improvements in economic performance became an important incentive for the augmentation and diversifi cation of foreign investment. Measures facilitating investments from abroad in fi nancial, telecommunications and transportation sectors led to a major expansion in fl ows coming from different Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Brazil's trade liberalisation measures coincided with major changes in the global environment. The new institutional frame built up with the creation of the WTO expanded Brazil's exposure to international regulations. The country's use of contingency measures increased, as did its participation in multilateral consultations and panel reviews. And while trade liberalisation measures progressed ahead, Brazil made use of new instruments to deal with trade balance problems.
Between 1948 and 1991, Brazil was involved in only 13 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlements, in 10 of them as a complainant. Between 1995 and 2006, the trade dispute settlements involving Brazil rose to 85.
5 For the fi rst time Brazil began to make use of various provisional safeguard measures to balance the effects of its liberalisation polices. Besides its involvement in numerous trade disputes Brazil has been an active player in the international community regarding the rules and institutional built up of the multilateral trade system. This has been an area of concern for Brazilian foreign policy since the old days of GATT. As mentioned, the Brazilian government was a fi rm advocate for the creation of WTO in 1995 and has since then adhered to the group of countries that demand a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Brazil has now concentrated its attention on two main subjects in multilateral trade negotiations: ending the subsidisation of agriculture, which is particularly aimed at the EU and the US, and the fl exibility of demands regarding new issues on the agenda. Brazil basically perceives itself as a small global trader in need of greater access to markets and assumes a defensive posture towards new trade restrictions. After the fi asco at the 2000 Third Ministerial WTO meeting in Seattle, a new attempt was made in 2001 at Doha in 2001.
6 When consensus for a new round of global trade negotiations was fi nally reached at the Cancun Ministerial in 2003, Brazil assumed a leading role-together with India-in the creation of the G-20, an initiative that will be analysed in the following section.
The third outstanding aspect of Brazil's foreign policy relates to regional affairs, as South America has assumed unprecedented importance for Brazil, based on the idea that the country should expand its responsibility in the maintenance of regional political stability by way of stronger democratic institutions and values. During the 1990s Brazil's regional policy gave priority to regional integration, particularly to the establishment of MERCOSUR.
7 Ties with the Andean countries were developed either as part of MERCOSUR's inter-regional negotiations, as those pursued with the Andean Community (CAN), or as a refl ection of specifi c bilateral interests. In this context, Brazil's identity as a Latin American country was gradually replaced by that of a South American power. Yet Brazil must deal with the constraints imposed by the perennial status of South America as a US sphere of infl uence. Indeed, Washington and Brasilia do not share the same premises when addressing confl ict-zone areas such as Colombia, or politically uncertain scenarios such as Bolivia and Venezuela.
Since the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century South America has faced a new phase of political instability, particularly in the Andean area. In the last six years, governments have been interrupted by major institutional breakdowns, massive popular protests, political violence and local turmoil.
8 Regional and sub-regional instruments and regimes-such as MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, the Rio Group, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Ibero-American summits-have been incapable of preventing or containing these developments, in what appears to be a cause and a consequence of the deepening of political fragmentation within the region. While, in general, domestic solutions have not abandoned democratic institutions, external interpretations and judgments of these developments have not been consensual. Washington has not dealt easily with this reality, categorising some of these processes as 'radical populism' and regarding them as an emerging threat in the inter-American environment.
As the country has dramatically expanded its economic and political presence in the area, new challenges have emerged. Acknowledgement on the part of its South American partners of its role as a regional leader has been held back by a combination of structural asymmetries, enduring misperceptions and political differences. Furthermore, lack of domestic concerns among the business, political and intellectual sectors has also contributed to a slowdown of Brazil's regional policy. The diffi culties in Brazil's makeover as a South American country, according to the project designed by the Lula administration, is in its early phase, and has been aggravated by the recent regional tensions particularly posed by Venezuela.
Brazil has refused a securitised approach and has expanded its political presence in the region, assuming new responsibilities by offering local political mediations and contributing to fi nding institutional and democratic outcomes. The Lula administration has been particularly active in the promotion of political governability in South America. This is probably the most important foreign policy change since the inauguration of the Lula administration because it contrasts with traditions and previous behaviours predicated upon the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of states. However, Brazil will have to move cautiously in the region; its involvement in local crises, together with growing trade and investment activities with its South American neighbours, has nevertheless not implied automatic acknowledgement of regional leadership. This could lead to new complications in Brazil's global affairs. If Brazil does not succeed in gaining support and acknowledgment from it neighbours, the US will become more hesitant to recognise its role as a regional leader. On the other hand, it will be Brazil's aim to build up such leadership in non-competitive terms with the US. Not only would it be less costly and risky if this trajectory could avoid having a negative impact on its relationship with the US, but it could also become a new incentive for both countries to identify common interests.
Finally, it is crucial to mention that the Lula government's foreign policy priorities have stimulated a polarised controversy about Brazil's foreign affairs within the 'attentive public'. Evaluations of the political gains and economic incentives for the country have been at the centre of these debates. For the fi rst time, international choices have become a matter of domestic politicisation leading to a clear differentiation between neo-liberal and neo-developmentalist inclinations.
10 Though more committed to the second option, the Lula government also mirrors the ambiguities and contradictions imposed upon it by the broad political spectrum that it relies upon.
II THE BILATERAL INITIATION
Diplomatic relations between India and Brazil were established in 1948. Nevertheless, bilateral interaction rarely went beyond formalities till very recently. Major geographical, historical and cultural differences have contributed to maintaining this relationship at a shallow level (Pimentel 2006) . During the Cold War these obstacles were even more effective as the foreign affairs of the two countries were subordinated to the logics of the bipolar order. Thus, Delhi-Brasilia understandings were mainly motivated by shared positions in multilateral arenas and coalition building, particularly those dealing with economic matters.
Bilateral relations picked up gradually in the 1990s. Since 1996, Delhi-Brasilia contacts have expanded with concrete results in trade, scientifi c and cultural cooperation. In Brazil, this relationship, fi rst advanced by the Cardoso administration, has assumed a growing importance in Lula's foreign policy as a central part of its South-South cooperative agenda. Inter-state relations have deepened thanks to a continuum of offi cial visits and a diversifi ed agenda of bilateral agreements. Besides, as has been mentioned earlier, the IBSA initiative has stimulated the strengthening of bilateral ties.
In June 2003, Yashwant Sinha, India's then External Affairs Minister, visited Brazil, marking the fi rst ever visit of an Indian Foreign Minister to the country. Four month later, the fi rst meeting of the Mixed Bilateral Commission between India and Brazil took place. During the state visit by President Lula Da Silva to India in 2004, seven agreements were signed covering topics such as the peaceful uses of outer space and cooperation on space research; visa exemptions for diplomats; tourism, cultural and educational exchange programs; and a Preferential Trade Agreement between MERCOSUR and India. President Lula has visited India three times in two years, while in September 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid the fi rst visit to Brazil by an Indian head of government in 38 years. Offi cial mis en scène has been accompanied by intense business contacts and deals in strategic areas such as energy, aircraft construction and cultural production.
Brazil has become India's largest trading partner in Latin America. From a Brazilian perspective, the expansion of trade with India must be understood in the context of recent transformations of the country's international trade. India fi ts into a selected group of new emerging economic partners together with South Africa, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Russia and Thailand (Polónia Rios and Iglesias 2007). For both countries bilateral trade has expanded three times its relative importance, but still represents less than 2 per cent of the total trade. In both cases, exports are more important than imports (see Tables 1 to 4 11 The top fi ve Indian exports to Brazil in 2005-06 were mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; organic chemicals; pharmaceutical products; nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and Bilateral trade has developed within the frame of the India-MERCOSUR agreement signed in 2004. Trade preference negotiations have refl ected the different tariff structures which explain higher reductions on the side of India than of its MERCOSUR partners. But the India-MERCOSUR agreement covers a small portion of trade involving a short list of 900 products. Many sectors have been left out of the agreement such as clothing, textiles, automobiles and auto-parts, all of which refl ect reciprocal sensitiveness. Differences are to be expected regarding agricultural goods in face of India's protectionism in this area (Valls Pereira 2007: 69) . Besides the contrasts owing to the competitiveness of MERCOSUR's agricultural exports, its advantages in processed food face barriers imposed by major cultural differences regarding eating habits and lifestyle. Indian investments in Brazil have also increased in recent years, particularly in the fi eld of information technology, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.
12 Recent studies have suggested that trade expansion will depend more on the spill-over effects of such investments than in the increase of trade fl ows per se (Valls Pereira 2007: 71) . One of the most promising areas considered for the deepening of trade and investment ties is that of ethanol production.
From a comparative perspective there are interesting parallels as to the trading partners of the two countries: the importance of the Chinese market is the same for both Brazil and India, and the US and the EU absorb a similar portion of Brazilian and Indian exports. Yet regional markets are much more relevant to Brazil than they are to India.
The Brazilian and Indian economies present complementary potential. Being a geologically rich country with a large landmass, Brazil has developed unique technologies in areas such as agro and food processing, mining, industrial application of bio-fuels and even oil exploration and nuclear power. India seeks partnership with Brazilian corporations for the transfer of these technologies. In return, India is poised to offer technologies for wind power, solar energy and bulk drugs for the production of medicines. Recent studies in Brazil have identifi ed the computer and software industry as a promising area for Indian-Brazilian technological and industrial cooperation. While Brazil has concentrated its attention on the development of a domestic market, India has been especially active in software exports (Costa Lima 2007) .
Together with an expanded terrain of common interests in multilateral political and economic matters, both countries are perceiving bilateralism as a stimulating and useful learning process. Besides the challenge of developing a diversifi ed set of bilateral cooperative initiatives, both countries share the idea that closer ties will open the opportunity of learning from positive experiences in scientifi c, economic and social policies.
Recently, common interests have been explored in defence cooperation as steps have been taken for expanding bilateral ties in security matters: the inauguration of a Joint Commission for Defence in 2007, the fi rst meeting for bilateral strategic talks and with the decision to designate military attaches at each other's embassies. Yet this can be a slippery and delicate area in the face of the different stances of both countries regarding non-proliferation. Undoubtedly the most diffi cult area of understanding has been sensitive technology, particularly dealing with nuclear proliferation. The fi rst attempt to establish common ground in this fi eld was the setting up of a joint commission for the 'Pacifi c Use of Nuclear Energy' which was called off by Brazil in 1998 in response to India's nuclear tests (Embassy of India 1999). Also, Brazilian diplomatic perceptions were quite negative regarding New Delhi's nuclear negotiations with the US and India's legitimate decision to not sign the NTP. This aspect distances Brazil from India and reduces the scope of identifying a common ground for dealing together with the discriminatory vices of the world system when hard power is at stake.
Finally, in environmental issues it is the ambition of both the countries to jointly express the developing world's position on climate change, which establishes a direct link between production and consumption patterns in industrialised economies and poverty levels in developing countries. Brazil and India strongly support the Program of Action contained in Agenda 21 and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in 2002.
III AFFIRMATIVE MULTILATERALISM AND THE IBSA AXIS
Brazil and India have become major actors in recent initiatives aimed at simultaneously promoting a renewed confi guration of multilateral institutions and innovative inter-state coalition building among developing countries. Both goals have become intertwined as the essence of these countries' invigorated efforts to strengthen SouthSouth relations (Alden and Vieira 2005) .
The notion that the developing world should seek to deepen its cooperation agenda is not a recent proposition in the international community. Decolonisation in the post-War period, the creation of the non-aligned movement, and the mobilisation of intermediate and developing nations in the context of the United Nations-which led to the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the formation of the Group of Seventy-Seven (G-77)-are the main antecedents to this process.
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The end of the Cold War and the expectations placed on multilateralism gave new impetus to inter-state coalition building among developing countries. A new wave of politicisation drove the coordination of joint initiatives among a group of intermediate developing nations with common international economic security goals. An effort to strengthen multilateralism has been carried forward with an enormous dose of pragmatism. Besides an enhanced participation in multilateral forums, Brazil and India have recently developed a positive agenda with the industrialised world; both countries have signed strategic partnership agreements with the EU and have negotiated new terms for their relations with the US. Needless to say, the political impact of a harmonious dialogue with Washington has been far more resonant in world politics in the case of India than in the case of Brazil due to the implications of the former for Asian security. Both Brazil and India have maintained a 'unity of approach' at the G-8 where they share the category of 'outreach partners'.
Three terrains illustrate the deepening Brazil-India teamwork in South-South diplomacy: (1) the creation of the G-20 clustering, formed by more than 20 WTO states-members; (2) the participation in the Group of 4, together with Germany and Japan; and (3) the formation of the IBSA block in 2003 together with South Africa.
The G-20 was created in August 2003 by 21 developing countries during the fi nal stage of preparation for the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, planned for the following month in Cancun. Brazil, India and Argentina became the core group articulating a platform designed to bring about negotiations and consensusbuilding. South Africa, Egypt, China and other Asian countries, Mexico and most of South America immediately joined the group. This initiative aimed to strengthen the grounds of commonalties regarding the opening of a new round of global trade negotiations; its representation is geographically broad, and its members represent 70 per cent of the world's rural population, 60 per cent of the world's total population and 26 per cent of world agricultural exports. The group's main purpose has been to reduce, with a view eventually to eliminating, subsidies for agricultural exports in global trade negotiations.
It is important to underscore the fact that Brazil and India have shared common positions in international trade negotiations since the GATT rounds of yore. Multilateral trade commonalities were made explicit in the 1980s when the question of the inclusion of new themes, particularly services, became one of the main controversies of the Uruguay Round. At that time Brazil and India's main effort was to resist the liberalising pressure coming from industrialised powers (Abreu 2004; Srinavasan and Tendulkar 2003) .
Identifi ed as 'a new politics of confrontation between the developed and developing world', the G-20 is presently perceived as a manifestation of collective dissatisfaction which assumed simultaneously an intra-South coordinating role and a North-South mediation function within WTO negotiations.
14 Also the G-20 illustrates a new equilibrium between ideology and pragmatism in the formulation of developing countries' international trade policies. As Andrew Hurrell and Amrita Narlikar have pointed out, the Cancun ministerial and its aftermath revealed a far different Southern approach towards trade negotiations than the one sustained in the 1970s. Brazil and India played leading roles in this transformation, which is better understood for its international rather than domestic motivations.
15 But Brasilia-Delhi G-20 understandings do not always present a rosy picture, and discrepancies have emerged in the context of WTO ministerials mainly as a refl ection of the different tariff systems applied to the agricultural products of both the countries. 16 The second Brazil-India shared experience to be mentioned is the G-4, an ad hoc group of the four states that aspire to become permanent members of a more equitable and representative structured UN Security Council (UNSC). For Brazil and India, the aspiration to become permanent members of the UNSC was presented as a tool to include the developing world in the inner circle of international politics. The dispute on restructuring the Security Council, which centres on whether to increase the number of members and adjust the modalities of rights (permanent or rotating) to voice and to veto power, led to the formation of several coalitions within the organisation. The intermediate states played a key role supporting reform, both in the North-countries such as Canada, Norway, and Sweden-and in the South such as the IBSA bloc.
After 10 years, lack of consensus regarding the elimination of the veto power and the expansion of the number of permanent members, reform of the UNSC did not take place. Growing scepticism took over after the unilateral decision of the US to proceed with military action in Iraq, completely overlooking the disapproval of UNSC members. The idea that this body could invigorate its military and political capabilities was completely discouraged. Also major world powers like the United States and China made explicit their reduced interest in any sort of change in status quo transformation.
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But the medium-term obstacles faced by Brazil and India to fi t in the inner circle of world politics have not slowed down their efforts to expand their presence and infl uence in the UN agenda. It is important to note that while Brazil and India kept a symmetric record during the Cold War, which reveals their close ties to one of the superpowers, a striking difference is observed since the Berlin Wall came down. In the last 18 years Brazil has occupied a seat at the Council four times while India did so only once. This shows that besides the recent support from the Latin America Group (GRULA) Brazil has been positively acknowledged as a collaborative actor by the fi ve UNSC permanent members. Another interesting development has been India's growing support to Brazil at the UN. An interesting example took place during the disputed voting between Venezuela and Guatemala for non-permanent seats in 2005, when in spite of US pressure Delhi aligned with Venezuela and Brazil (India Abroad 2006). Still in the UN environment, it is important to underline the shared participation of both countries in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). Besides keeping a similar record regarding the number of UNPKO in which they have participated since the end of the Cold War, there are several operations in which they have worked together (see Table 5 ).
The third and most fertile terrain for Brazil-India South-South diplomacy has been the IBSA bloc, conceived as a strategic partnership among developing countries. Arising out of South Africa's inspiration, Brazil's initiative and India's immediate acceptance, an attempt to transform coincidental or episodic, inter-state cooperation into a concrete cooperative agenda, took place in Brasilia in 2003 when India, Brazil and South Africa signed the Declaration of Brasilia, instituting the IBSA as a trilateral forum for articulating their interests and positions based on common interests. The initiative seeks to pursue fi ve aspirations:
To represent an affi rmative voice of the emerging countries in the debate on globalisation; To represent a counterpoint to the G-8; To emphasise the value of economic diplomacy as a tool for bringing countries together; To bolster the importance of development cooperation on the agendas for international negotiation and; To bring pressure to bear as a voice of the South in the main multilateral forums (United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank).
The IBSA initiative is innovative insofar as it brings together developing countries that are regionally based middle powers, opening space for an inter-regional agenda. In addition to permanent efforts to coordinate stances at multilateral forums, the three countries have expanded bilateral economic and political relations. The IBSA initiative has benefi ted from the positive political environment of its members and has relied upon the combination of three proactive presidential/prime ministerial diplomacies. But IBSA represents less than the sum of its members. All three countries carry strong identities within the international community: South Africa stands for the struggle against racism, India for the largest democracy and Brazil for the promotion of sustainable development.
During 2003-07 seven high-level IBSA meetings were held. 18 On each occasion, trilateralism has expanded the scope and level of cooperation. Besides, a special deal between MERCOSUR and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) to increase trade and investment between both economic blocs, negotiations took place to put forward health cooperation programmes, particularly regarding biotechnology research and pharmaceuticals production. IBSA has also endorsed the idea that since the South is heterogeneous and asymmetric, different responsibilities and roles must be assumed. This explains IBSA's decision in 2006 to create a development fund of US$ 1.3 million to develop cooperative projects to be implemented in Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Laos and Palestine.
Increased inter-governmental consultation and cooperation has deepened this South-South partnership. Foreign policy convergence between the three states has concentrated upon the need to strengthen multilateralism in world affairs, with special emphasis on the need to reform the UN framework and the International Financial Architecture.
19 It must be stated, however, that more than contesting the world power structure, IBSA criticises the distribution of power in specifi c agendas. Its aim is to push for the participation in the rule-making inner circle instead of accepting the condition of passive rule-takers. In this sense, IBSA intends to politicise but not ideologise world politics and economics. Furthermore, the coalition has developed a niche diplomacy approach which addresses topics such as the Palestine-Israeli peace process, the stability and unity of Iraq, a diplomatic solution for the Iranian nuclear programme and reengaging in substantial work at the Conference on Disarmament.
It is important to stress that the IBSA bloc has been particularly careful when addressing security issues. On the one hand, no mention has been made of an agenda involving South America, South Asia or Southern Africa confl ict-resolution, regional security or even humanitarian intervention and on the other hand, the use of the concept of human security, which treats social and environment disruptions as threats, has been avoided.
IV CONCLUDING REMARKS
Rival and contentious inter-state relations do not need to be based upon a deep acquaintance and mutual information, and may not result from the escalation of previous confl ictive relationships. When John Lewis Gaddis explained the logics of the Cold War, he pointed to the lack of a confl ictive background in previous US-Soviet relations (Gaddis 1987 ). Yet the same logic cannot be applied to inter-state cooperative relations which are based upon trust, converging interests and commonalities, and therefore require reciprocal knowledge. For countries such as Brazil and India which have maintained an extremely limited bilateral agenda, the possibility of developing permanent ties based upon common interests will need time. This is even more so in the case of the two nations whose continental dimensions have resulted in inward political cultures. Major efforts will have to be undertaken to promote interaction and reciprocal learning between governmental and societal sectors, accompanied by an intellectual exchange. The building of an epistemic community in the fi elds of comparative studies and South-South international relations could play a positive role in this process.
Brazil and India have moved in the direction of a closer relationship in a context in which both have been conducting their foreign affairs with the aim of diversifying and expanding partnerships, responsibilities and prestige in the international context. These two countries are involved in multiple fronts with the purpose of upgrading their international presence, which suggests that their efforts to deepen bilateralism will necessarily have to be compatible with other global and regional arrangements and alliances.
The political and economic assets of Brazil and India are qualitatively and quantitatively different. While India's economic growth has followed a 'Chinese' pattern in the last years, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is still behind Brazil. Social indicators refl ect the dramatic implications of this difference in the face of the demographic contrasts between both countries. 20 These contrasts have an important impact on the areas in which both countries have been involved in the creation of coalitions in trade negotiations, especially with regard to agricultural products. Agriculture in India which has been one of the economic sectors that has expanded the most has relied upon a protective tariff which offers very little fl exibility in face of India's social reality. Brazil, in contrast, has become outstanding for the competitiveness of its agro-industry. Sceptical analyses on South-South coalitions in international trade have addressed the particularities of the Brazilian-Indian case (Oliveira and Onuki 2006) . But the main difference between both the countries is strategic. India is a nuclear power and intends to play the hard power game. It has recently inaugurated a new pattern of strategic understanding with the US, it participates in a trilateral forum with China and Russia and must deal directly with an unstable regional neighbourhood in which inter-state tensions are aggravated by nuclear deterrence and Islamist terrorism. Brazil is a non-nuclear state located in the only surviving post-Cold War sphere of infl uence characterised as a marginal strategic zone. Nevertheless, while committed to maintaining its soft power status, Brazil has been a successful self-made regional power avoiding give and take compensations provided by bandwagoning temptations.
Even though the G-4 efforts have been insuffi cient to push forward the UNSC reform it has undoubtedly served Brazil and India to upgrade their political status in world politics. However, the aspiration to become a permanent member of the Council has also increased expectations of the international community regarding responsibilities to be assumed by both countries in the preservation of peace and stability of the regions they claim to represent.
As both countries assume their regional power status, they are likely to play counterbalancing roles. For Brazil, this role involves attenuating the dominating presence of the US in South America. Also, Brazil and India share the possibility of becoming effective neutralisers in intra-regional rivalry chessboards: while Brazil may come to play as a mediator in both US-Venezuela and US-Cuba reciprocal aggressions and misperceptions, India could assume a similar role in the thorny China-Japan relationship.
There has been a deliberate effort to connect the strengthening of the IBSA initiative with the deepening of the bilateral ties between the three countries. In many aspects the agenda and political discourse of IBSA reinforces itself in bilateral terms. This is clear in the case of Brazil-India relations.
If and when the IBSA cooperation spills over to the security fi eld, this could open up space for a myriad of coordinated initiatives to take place, involving peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, the promotion of (1) an agenda for peace, confl ict prevention and post-confl ict rehabilitation, and (2) Indeed, it has become crucial to avoid the worrying trend of humanitarian intervention replacing development aid, as it is for trade negotiations to subordinate to security priorities and for formal democratic rule to overlook the protection of human rights. But this kind of cooperation will move more slowly. While the possibility of deepening inter-regional relations is one of IBSA's main attributes, this potential is accompanied by a subtle premise of non-interference in each other's regional affairs. Nevertheless, inter-regionalism can be meaningful in a world where regions are to become relevant actors in the promotion of political and security stability. The generic production of anti-retroviral drugs at low production prices has become a large industry in Brazil. While it receives important support from local health authorities, the enforcement of the TRIPS provisions would affect not only the production of these generic variants, but the costs involved in the treatment of AIDS. The use of non-licensed pharmaceuticals in the Brazilian anti-AIDS programme had already become a touchy issue in US-Brazil understandings on intellectual property, and at Doha two coalitions were formed: one led by Brazil and India, followed by a broad group of less developed countries; the other by the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Germany. While the fi rst block stood for the inclusion of a more fl exible interpretation of the TRIPS provisions in the case of public health necessities, the other did not.Thanks to a last-minute switch by the US, the fi rst group fi nally prevailed (see Bate and Tren 2006; WTO 2007b) 15. In the case of both India and Brazil, the state still plays a dominating role in the formulation of international trade policy, while the involvement of business interests and organisations has been quite marginal (see Hurrell and Narlikar 2006) . 16. An example of Brazil-India non-convergence has been the negotiation over the Blue Box-a term used to refer to Article 5.6 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture-in the July Framework of 2004. In 2004 the US proposed a revision of the criteria for inclusion in the Blue Box in order to incorporate direct payments to producers that were not tied to production. Although initially Brazil and India aligned themselves with the rest of the G-20 and manifested their disagreement, both countries fi nally brokered a deal. The key to the victorious US strategy was bringing Brazil and India into the core of the negotiations (an informal grouping called the Five Interested Parties [FIPS] , composed of the US, EU, Australia, Brazil and India) and acceding to their main concerns. In the case of India, its objective was to avoid the 'Swiss Formula' for cutting tariffs that would require it to bring down its agricultural tariffs, which are far less competitive than those adopted by Brazil (see Bello and Kwa 2004; Murphy and Suppan 2005; Raghavan 2004 
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